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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

Attachment to
NFIB-13.1/67
6 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: Establishment of an Interagency Working Group to
Determine Current and Future Analytical Resources
Devoted to Arms Control

1. The Director of Central Intelligence has asked me to undertake an interagency study to estimate the amount of analytical effort now devoted to arms control matters and to project future requirements for analytical resources for this purpose under various arms control scenarios.

2. While the impact of arms control support on intelligence collection programs has been assessed repeatedly, intelligence production programs have yet to be assessed comprehensively in this light. We know that the analytical effort has grown, but we have no data on either its scale or rate of growth. Thus there is no basis for estimating future analytical needs under various assumptions regarding the course of arms control negotiations, or conversely how seriously the Community's future production priorities may be affected.

3. Accordingly, I am authorizing the establishment of an interagency working group (1) to estimate the current allocation of analytical effort to arms control matters and (2) to make projections of future analytical requirements based on various assumptions about the level of U.S. arms control activity. Representatives of all agencies involved in arms control work are asked to participate.

25X1 4. I have asked [] to lead this working group. He has prepared some preliminary thoughts on the approach to the study in the form of a prospectus which is attached. A meeting to discuss the scope and organization of the study, working assignments, and schedules will convene on Wednesday, 14 November at 0930, Room 6E60, CIA Headquarters. Please have the name of your representative passed to [] by close of business Monday, 12 November. 25

[]
Bruce C. Clarke, Jr. 25

(1 November 1979)

Attachment:

Prospectus, as stated above

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The Intelligence Commitment to Arms Control

A Prospectus

The Director of Central Intelligence has commissioned a study of the analytical resources of the Intelligence Community dedicated to the US arms control process. This memorandum is an attempt to describe the relationship between intelligence and arms control, define the task and lay out a work program.

The intelligence input to the arms control process is the result of the interplay of a set of activities which for convenience are grouped by function: collection, processing, and analysis. The output of each function serves as the input to the next, with the output of analysis serving as the input to the policy formulation process. Collection systems are generally grouped by source: human sources (HUMINT), signals (SIGINT), photography (PHOTINT), radar (RADINT), infrared (IRINT), and so on. Processing might be thought of as interpreting the raw information and converting it into a form suitable for use in analysis. By this definition, photointerpreters and signals specialists are processors of intelligence. A great deal of substantive knowledge and analytical effort is required to perform this function, however, and therefore for the purpose of this study "processors" are considered a type of analyst. Another type is the intelligence officer who melds the intelligence inputs from all sources into a coherent report, the output of his analysis.

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This study attempts to look five years or so into the future. This is a short time period during which planned technical collection programs are for the most part immutable and new programs cannot be brought to fruition. Non-technical collection programs are largely unpredictable in nature. Therefore, this study will examine only the effect of arms control on the analytical resources of the Intelligence Community.

Functions of Intelligence in the Arms Control Process:
Structuring the Problem

For analytical purposes, the arms control process can be divided into four stages:

- Stage I: Policy Formulation
- Stage II: Negotiations
- Stage III: Treaty Ratification
- Stage IV: Monitoring Compliance.

The first three steps overlap and often occur simultaneously. Stage IV, Monitoring, generally begins only when the treaty enters in force, at the time that the treaty instruments are exchanged following ratification.

Intelligence support of an analytical nature is required in all stages of the arms control process. Examples of the kinds of activities provided by intelligence during the various stages are shown below:

Stage I: Policy Formulation

--preparation of current order of battle of foreign military forces and periodic updates;

--estimating foreign capabilities to develop and deploy weapons and weapons systems;

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--comparing US/Allied and foreign military forces, weapon systems and capabilities, and preparation of periodic updates;

--measuring US/Allied monitoring and detection capabilities and developing monitoring strategies;

--identifying foreign views and approaches regarding arms control;

--participating in meetings, reviewing policy papers, preparing briefings and briefing books.

Stage II: Negotiations

--continuation of Stage I activities, updating information as required;

--providing overseas support on the spot and at Headquarters;

--providing sanitized intelligence to Allies, as requested.

Stage III: Treaty Ratification

--continuation of many Stage I functions;

--providing support to federal officials in briefing the Congress and providing substantive intelligence briefings to Congressional committees and staff;

--assisting in preparing public presentations.

Stage IV: Monitoring Compliance

--implementing the collection strategy;

--producing periodic and spot reports and briefings.

While the terms of an arms control agreement are negotiated with an eye to the ability of the United States to monitor compliance using national technical means of verification, the resources required for monitoring can vary greatly depending on the complexity and specificity of the provisions of the agreement. For example, it takes far less time

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to determine that an ICBM silo has been destroyed than to ensure that certain parameters of destructions have been met. Similarly, it is far easier to determine that a new ICBM has been tested than to ensure that its launch or throw weight do not exceed that of the SS-19 or vary from existing ICBM types by more than ± 5 percent. As a rule, the more narrowly defined the parameter, the more difficult the monitoring task and the greater the resource commitment that must be made.

The commitment of resources is also a function of the null hypothesis, that is, proving beyond reasonable doubt that certain actions or events have not taken place. To a large extent, the provisions of arms control agreements are cast in just such terms and as a result place additional strain on both collections systems and analysts.

Plan of Work

1. Estimate and project the analytical manpower in many years attributable to the arms control process over and above that which would be required to perform routine intelligence functions. For some, the determination of the allocation of manpower to arms control is clear cut; for example, the SALT Support Staff owes its existence to arms control and would dissolve if the arms control process disappeared. For others, the determination will be subjective and artificial; for example, analysts responsible for producing reports on Soviet ICBM deployment who provide inputs to monitoring reports would produce intelligence on that subject whether there were arms control or not. Their task will be to determine what fraction of their time is

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taken up exclusively by arms control in contrast to what they would normally devote to intelligence functions anyway.

2. Estimates should be made for Fiscal Year 1979 in order to establish a frame of reference.

3. Projections should be made for FY-1980, FY-1983, and FY-1985 using various assumptions regarding the course of arms control negotiations.

4. Estimates and projections should be made for professional manpower. Clerical support will be considered a function of professional manpower. Professional manpower should be identified by type: Analytical (GS-07/14), Managerial (GS-14/15), and Executive (GS-16/18).

5. Estimates and projections should be grouped according to the stages in the arms control process described above (Stage I: Policy Formulation; Stage II: Negotiations; Stage III: Treaty Ratification; Stage IV: Monitoring Compliance).

6. The arms control negotiations to be included in the study are as follows:

SALT I	ASAT
SALT II	CW
SALT III (including TNF)	CAT
MBFR	CTB
	Indian Ocean.

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7. Assumptions. For the purpose of this study, assume the following:

--SALT II is ratified and enters into force in FY-1980.

--SALT III negotiations begin in FY-1980; a treaty is signed in FY-1984 and enters into force in FY-1985.

--MBFR/Phase I treaty is signed in FY-1981 and enters into force in FY-1982.

--MBFR/Phase II negotiations continue through FY-1985.

--ASAT treaty is signed in FY-1981 and enters into force in FY-1982.

--All other arms control negotiations remain at the talking stage.

8. Format. Data should be prepared and submitted in a standardized format to facilitate summarization and manipulation. The format of the summary table is attached and should be used as the format for all submissions from contributing agencies. Contributors to the study are invited to add explanatory notes to the tables.

9. Schedule. A schedule for developing this study will be drawn up at the first meeting of the working group.

10. Participants in the study are invited to submit text on areas of special interest to them for inclusion in the final report.

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Estimated Analytical Manpower of the Intelligence Community
Dedicated to Arms Control Negotiations in Many years, FY-1979

Stage of Negotiations	SALT I	SALT II	SALT III	MBFR	ASAT	CTB	CAT	CW	Indian Ocean	TOTAL
Stage I Analytical Managerial Executive										
Stage II Analytical Managerial Executive										
Stage III Analytical Managerial Executive										
Stage IV Analytical Managerial Executive										
TOTAL:										

- Note 1: For the years FY-1980, FY-1983, and FY-1985, change the word "Estimated" to "Projected."
Note 2: Supporting tables from contributors should be in the same format. The title should indicate the name of the contributing agency in place of "the Intelligence Community."
Note 3: Contributing agencies are urged to use this format in assembling data from their subordinate bureaus, offices, branches, sections, etc.

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